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I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that creditors have better memories than debtors.1  
That saying rings true yet again.  In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, there is a norm 
that all senior creditors must be paid back in full before any junior interests 
are satisfied at all.2  This is known as the absolute priority rule.3  In 2017, 
the United States Supreme Court decided Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding 
Corp. (Jevic).4  The Jevic Court overruled a Third Circuit case,5 which 
held that a structured dismissal6 could deviate from the absolute priority 
rule in order to meet a better and quicker result in the settlement context 
for certain creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.7 The Supreme Court held, 
in relevant part, that structured dismissals that deviate from priority rules 
as part of a final distribution of assets may not be approved over the 
objection of creditors.8 
While the Court’s decision remedied the priority-deviation found in 
the Third Circuit case, it limited its decision to the specific structured 
dismissal at issue because it was a final distribution of assets.9  By limiting 
its decision to final dispositions in a bankruptcy proceeding, the Court left 
the door open for priority-deviation in interim distributions of assets.10  In 
fact, the Court noted the benefits of interim priority-deviations and 
expressly included an example of such a deviation in the context of an 
                                                                                                                         
 1 Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanac, (1736). 
 2 See Amy Timm, Note, The Gift That Gives Too Much: Invalidating a Gifting 
Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1649 (2013). 
 3 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (in order to be fair and equitable concerning 
classes of unsecured claims during plan confirmation: “the holder of any claim or interest 
that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account 
of such junior claim or interest any property . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
 4 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). 
 5 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic 
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 6 See id. at 181 (defining structured dismissals as “simply dismissals that are preceded 
by other orders of the bankruptcy court (e.g., orders approving settlements, granting 
releases, and so forth) that remain in effect after dismissal.”); see also Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 
979 (relying on the American Bankruptcy Institute in defining structured dismissals as a: 
“hybrid dismissal and confirmation order . . . that . . . typically dismisses the case while, 
among other things, approving certain distributions to creditors, granting certain third-party 
releases, enjoining certain conduct by creditors, and not necessarily vacating orders or 
unwinding transactions undertaken during the case.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 7 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184–85. 
 8 See Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 976–77. 
 9 See id. at 978 (“A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the dismissal of a 
Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic 
priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final 
distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”) (emphasis added). 
 10 See id. at 985 (suggesting that interim distributions of assets are permissible in 
Chapter 11 cases due to the difficulty of applying priority rules to unresolved claims). 
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interim settlement.11  Due to Jevic’s express approval of interim priority-
deviation, this Comment suggests that the interim settlement context could 
be the avenue of choice going forward for creditors seeking to deviate 
from priority rules in Chapter 11.12 
Moreover, the Court’s holding could open the floodgates for an 
increase of future priority-deviation, despite the fact that priority must be 
followed at the final resolution of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.13  Chapter 
11 debtors are still allowed to settle claims with creditors outside of the 
priority scheme before the case is made final, especially if there are 
Bankruptcy Code related justifications for priority-deviation.14  While the 
Supreme Court’s Jevic decision implied a more strict application of the 
absolute priority rule, an increase in deviation may nonetheless result 
because creditors will now know the parameters of the rule and how to 
work around it.  As will be discussed further in this Comment, a lack of 
priority can create unjust results in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.15 
Before the Supreme Court decided Jevic, there existed a circuit split 
concerning application of the absolute priority rule vis-à-vis the settlement 
context.16  The Third Circuit decision that was overruled by the Supreme 
Court in Jevic held that a structured dismissal as part of a final settlement 
may deviate from priority.17  Conversely, a Fifth Circuit decision,18 held 
that in order to be fair and equitable, priority must be respected in Chapter 
11 cases even in the analysis of a settlement agreement.19  This Comment 
                                                                                                                         
 11 See id. (distinguishing the Second Circuit decision of In re Iridium Operating LLC, 
as a case that involved an interim distribution of settlement proceeds, from the Third Circuit 
case of In re Jevic that involved a final disposition of a settlement and structured dismissal); 
see also Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating 
LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding an interim distribution of settlement 
proceeds that deviated from priority). 
 12 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 13 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 14 See, e.g., Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (noting the justifications for interim priority-
deviation in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the Court stated: “[b]ut in [interim distributions] one 
can generally find significant Code-related objectives that the priority-violating 
distributions serve.”); In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 467 (“Here, the bankruptcy court identified 
a proper [Code] justification for the [interim] Settlement.”); In re Fryar, 1:16-bk-13559-
SDR, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1123, at *14 (E.D. Tenn. April 25, 2017) (noting that the 
priority-deviating-settlement at issue must be justified by Code-related objectives in order 
to be upheld over creditor objections). 
 15 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 16 Compare Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In 
re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that a structured dismissal 
as part of a settlement agreement, may, in rare instances, deviate from priority rules), with 
In re AWECO Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that priority must be followed 
in order for a settlement to be approved as fair and equitable). 
 17 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184–85. 
 18 In re AWECO Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 19 See id. at 300. 
294 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:291 
will discuss the facts of each Circuit in order to show the impact and 
procedural history of the Supreme Court case.20  This Comment will then 
argue that the Supreme Court did not fully resolve the issue of absolute 
priority,21 and absolving this issue can be accomplished by applying the 
Fifth Circuit’s fair and equitable standard to all phases of a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding.22 
As a precursor to the background section of this Comment, it is 
important to note that Chapter 11 bankruptcy law is founded upon 
principles of priority.23  Statutory provisions assign creditors to a certain 
pecking order for purposes of repayment by the debtor.24  For example, 
Section 507 of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code contains a general priority 
scheme, which favors certain creditors over others in regards to the order 
in which proceeds from the debtor’s assets are distributed.25  Priority rules 
such as Section 507 should be well known by Chapter 11 parties due to 
the prospect of future asset reorganization. Priority for creditors could 
mean the difference between getting paid in full and not getting paid at all. 
Alternatively, the absolute priority rule, found at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), only applies to confirmed plans of reorganization.26  
Before Jevic, there was confusion amongst the courts as to whether or not 
the absolute priority rule applied to the settlement context of a Chapter 11 
proceeding.27  The Jevic Court, in dicta, ultimately stated the rule does 
apply to the settlement context, but only if the settlement at issue is a final 
disposition.28  Therefore, the absolute priority rule currently remains 
confined to the final disposition stage of a Chapter 11 case, leaving open 
the option to deviate at all other stages.  While the rule itself is arguably 
sui generis by virtue of the limited context in which it is applied,29 the 
objective of this Comment is to expand the absolute priority rule to apply 
to all phases of Chapter 11.30 
Since the settlement context can be the avenue of choice for future 
priority-deviation, it is important to consider the power a judge has in 
                                                                                                                         
 20 See discussions infra Part II.B–D. 
 21 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 22 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 23 See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“The Code’s 
priority system constitutes a basic underpinning of business bankruptcy law.”). 
 24 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 25 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 507 (2016). 
 26 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 27 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (the Court stated that interim distributions of assets that 
deviate from priority are usually justified, therefore suggesting priority-deviation in the 
pre-plan context is permissible). 
 29 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 30 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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approving a settlement.  The decision of whether to uphold an agreement 
between parties “lies within the discretion of the trial judge;” and for an 
appellate court to reverse, it must be shown that the trial court abused its 
discretion.31  Therefore, most decisions concerning settlements at the trial 
court level will be upheld, absent a showing that the decision was handed 
down arbitrarily or willfully.32  It should be noted, however, that 
bankruptcy courts may uphold settlements only if they are found to be fair 
and equitable.33  Due to the Supreme Court decision in Jevic, the allowance 
of priority-deviations in interim distributions of assets as opposed to final 
dispositions can create a vague line for bankruptcy courts to interpret;34 
which may cause confusion as to what distributions will be upheld as fair 
and equitable. 
As mentioned above, the crux of this Comment aims to show that the 
issue of absolute priority enveloping interim Chapter 11 distributions can 
be resolved by following the Fifth Circuit’s fair and equitable standard at 
all stages of a bankruptcy proceeding.35  The Fifth Circuit noted that, “[t]he 
words ‘fair and equitable’ are terms of art [in bankruptcy law] – they mean 
that ‘senior interests are entitled to full priority over junior ones.’”36  While 
this may make settlements harder to achieve,37 a rigid application of the 
absolute priority rule lets creditors know where they stand from the onset 
                                                                                                                         
 31 In re AWECO Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Matter of Jackson 
Brewing Co. (In re Jackson Brewing Co.), 624 F.2d 599, 602–03 (5th Cir. 1980)); see 
Matter of Walsh Const. Inc., 669 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Matter of 
Ocobock, 608 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Albert-Harris Inc., 313 F.2d 447, 
449 (6th Cir. 1963). 
 32 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298 (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 
(1931)). 
 33 Id. (quoting Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968)) (citing 
In re Jackson Brewing Co., 624 F.2d at 602). 
 34 See Stephen J. Lubben, Supreme Court Ruling Draws a Vague Line in Bankruptcy 




gtype=collection (discussing the Court’s noted contrast between interim and final 
distributions of assets as well as the vagueness that can correspond between the terms 
“interim” and “final” distributions, author Stephen J. Lubben noted, “[o]f course, this line 
is not always obvious. In the automotive cases, for example, the assets of General Motors 
and Chrysler were sold to newly formed buyers. The sale process itself was interim . . . but 
the outcome of that process was largely set once the sale closed. Nonetheless, Justice 
Breyer suggest these two sales were an example of permissible interim distributions.”). 
 35 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 36 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298 (quoting SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 
379 U.S. 594, 611 (1965)) (citing Anderson, 390 U.S. at 441). 
 37 See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic 
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 185 (3d Cir. 2015) (“If courts required settlements to be 
perfect, they would seldom be approved . . . .”). 
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of any possible litigation.  It also lets debtors know their specific 
obligations and could eventually facilitate quicker negotiations. Thus, 
adhering to the absolute priority rule outside of the final disposition 
context could lead to more efficient negotiations. 
Ultimately, if the absolute priority rule is to have any teeth, it must 
be implemented in all aspects of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and 
not just in final dispositions.  Specifically, the absolute priority rule must 
apply to interim settlements in order to avoid the potential increase of 
priority-deviation through this medium.  Most importantly, adhering to a 
rigid application of priority at all stages of a Chapter 11 case would 
dovetail more completely with the fair and equitable standard found 
throughout bankruptcy law.  By applying the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, in 
the event that an interim settlement is approved and a senior creditor is 
skipped in favor of a more junior creditor, the deciding court should be 
deemed to have abused its discretion.38 
It has been noted that, “[e]quitable considerations should be 
preeminent in the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”39  There is no 
fairness or equity to be found when senior creditors are skipped over by 
more junior creditors in order to facilitate quicker and more efficient 
Chapter 11 reorganizations.40  While in practice a lenient priority 
mechanism appears to create a more seamless transition for 
reorganization, it nonetheless burdens creditors who are left completely 
out of the equation after junior interests’ skip over them in priority.  By 
allowing interim devices to deviate from priority, the senior creditors in a 
Chapter 11 case are at a greater risk of leaving the bankruptcy proceeding 
empty handed. 
Part II of this Comment will outline the general background terms 
and functions of bankruptcy law.  It will also outline the facts and 
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit decision, the Third Circuit decision, and the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in overruling the Third Circuit.  Part III of this 
Comment will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision, the dangers of 
priority-deviation, alternative viewpoints supporting lenient application of 
priority, and the Fifth Circuit’s fair and equitable standard and why it 
needs to apply to all stages in a Chapter 11 proceeding. Finally,  Part IV 
of this Comment will conclude the issue. 
                                                                                                                         
 38 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298. 
 39 Id. at 300. See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966); see also Demet 
v. Harralson, 399 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 40 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
It is easy to fall into the false dichotomy that describes Chapter 11 as 
only a device for reorganization and Chapter 7 as the only means of 
liquidation.41  Conversely, Chapter 11 bankruptcy expressly envisions 
liquidation through a plan, “[a]nd the debtor (and thus its management) 
has an absolute right to one conversion between the two chapters.”42  
While this is true, many financially stressed businesses seek protection 
through the instruments of Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a means of 
reorganizing their debt in an effort to continue on with their business.43  
Conventional wisdom explains why the debtor’s management prefers 
Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 7—it is because the Bankruptcy Code 
orders a trustee in every Chapter 7 case.44  Alternatively, in Chapter 11, 
the custom is that the debtor and its administration remain “in possession,” 
with the rights and duties of a trustee.45  This gives the Chapter 11 debtor 
much more breathing room to operate its business and ward off the 
demands of its creditors.46 
Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, an automatic stay is issued to 
thwart creditors from entering into further debt collection processes.47  The 
stay “enjoins creditors from enforcing pre-petition obligations” or 
pursuing the debtor’s property.48  After the stay is issued and creditors are 
halted from debt collection, the goal becomes the debtor’s exit from 
bankruptcy while maximizing repayment.49  The debtor offers a “plan of 
reorganization,” which entails an agreement “to repay a portion of the debt 
[owed] over a specified period of time.”50  While the reorganization plan 
is discussed “between the debtor and a committee appointed by the United 
States Trustee on behalf of the creditors[,]” as mentioned above, the 
                                                                                                                         
 41 Stephen J. Lubben, Article, Business Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65 (2007). 
 42 Id. at 66. 
 43 Elizabeth Blakely, Comment, Dewey Ranch and the Role of the Bankruptcy Court 
in Decisions Relating to the Permissible Control of National Sports Leagues Over 
Individual Franchise Owners, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 105, 108 (2011). 
 44 Lubben, supra note 41, at 66 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-02). 
 45 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1107). 
 46 See Diane Lourdes Dick, Article, Bankruptcy’s Corporate Tax Loophole, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2273, 2282 (2014); see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 
(1934) (“[Bankruptcy] gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in 
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of 
preexisting debt.”). 
 47 See Blakely, supra note 43. 
 48 See Dick, supra note 46. 
 49 See id. 
 50 Blakely, supra note 43; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-29. 
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debtor’s management assumes a role as the debtor in possession51 and 
keeps control of the business and its assets.52  With the permission of the 
bankruptcy court, financing is often approved for the debtor in possession 
to allow the bankrupt business to carry on its operations during the stay 
period.53 
In general, the Chapter 11 plan is an amalgam of distribution; it lays 
out the procedure for dividing assets to various constituents.54  Due to the 
significance of the plan, the Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the right to 
file a Chapter 11 plan within 120 days.55  Once the plan of reorganization 
is set in stone, “Chapter 11 rules require the creditors to either accept or 
reject the plan.”56  The reorganization plan is approved if the following 
two conditions are met: “(1) the plan is accepted by more than half of the 
total number of claimants in each class; and (2) the amount claimed by 
those accepting claimants is at least two-thirds of the total amount claimed 
against the debtor by that class.”57  If all classes of creditors do not meet 
these conditions and the plan for reorganization is rejected, “the 
bankruptcy judge still has the discretion to approve the plan over an 
objection by the creditors.”58 
A major condition is that the reorganization plan must be “fair and 
equitable” in regard to the dissenting classes.59  A plan is deemed “fair and 
equitable” when dissenting class members are given property equal in 
value to their allowed claims, or to the extent less than that amount is 
received, “no creditor of lesser priority (or any equity security holder) 
receives any distribution under the plan.”60  This requirement, which is 
paramount in bankruptcy law, is normally referred to as the “absolute 
priority rule.”61  This rule serves as an important protection for creditors 
by ensuring that, “unless their claims are paid in full or they agree 
otherwise, the Chapter 11 plan will – with limited exceptions – respect the 
                                                                                                                         
 51 See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1979). 
 52 Blakely, supra note 43, at 108–09. 
 53 Id. at 109. (citing Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank 
Insolvency Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 143, 162 
(2007)). 
 54 Dick, supra note 46, at 2283. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Blakely, supra note 43, at 109 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1126). 
 57 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 58 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)); see Jeffery M. Sharp, Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Section 1129, and the New Capital Quagmire: A Call for Congressional Response, 28 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 525, 550 (1991); see also Jeffrey I. Werbalowsky, Reforming Chapter 11: 
Building an International Restructuring Model, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 561, 574 n.40 
(1999). 
 59 Dick, supra note 46, at 2284 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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relative collection rights of creditors under state law.”62  Future sections 
of this work discuss how the absolute priority rule ought to apply without 
exceptions throughout a Chapter 11 case and not just in confirmed plans 
of reorganization.63 
B. The Fifth Circuit’s View: Adherence to the Absolute Priority Rule 
In 1984, the Fifth Circuit decided the case of In re AWECO, Inc. 
(AWECO),64 which ruled that the fair and equitable standard applies to 
settlements and that “fair and equitable” means compliant with the priority 
scheme, even outside the context of a Chapter 11 plan.65  There were three 
parties involved in this case: AWECO, Inc. (“AWECO”), United 
American Car Co. (“United”), and the United States.66  The debtor, 
AWECO, engaged in various business endeavors, but was mostly 
concerned with its oil and gas business.67  AWECO voluntarily filed a 
Chapter 11 petition in early 1981, and filed a plan of reorganization several 
months later.68  The plan was never offered to the court for confirmation 
or presented to creditors for authorization.69 
One of AWECO’s creditors, United, had an unliquidated and 
unsecured claim for roughly $27 million, which produced the appeal to the 
Fifth Circuit.70  The claim stemmed from two contracts between AWECO 
and United wherein “AWECO agreed to purchase approximately $40 
million worth of railroad cars from United.”71  AWECO declined to fulfill 
its end of the bargain and United sued for fraud and breach of contract, 
asserting $27 million in damages.72 After two years of litigation and while 
AWECO’s Chapter 11 petition was pending, AWECO and United reached 
a settlement.73  The settlement’s terms called for AWECO to transfer some 
$5.3 million worth of property and cash to United.74  Part of the assets to 
be transferred from AWECO to United included property that secured 
Sutton Investments, Inc.’s (Sutton) claim, which is another one of 
AWECO’s creditors.75 
                                                                                                                         
 62 Id. 
 63 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 64 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 65 Id. at 298. 
 66 Id. at 295. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 295. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 295–96. 
 75 Id. at 296. 
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AWECO filed notice with the bankruptcy court in early November 
of 1981, noting its aim to settle the litigation.76  AWECO’s four creditors: 
“[t]he Department of Energy, the IRS, Sutton, and the Creditors’ 
Committee all filed objections to the proposed settlement.”77  On 
December 30, 1981, the bankruptcy court held a hearing to consider the 
objection from the Department of Energy, the IRS, and Sutton, which 
heard testimony from: “AWECO’s president, the court-appointed 
examiner, the debtor’s comptroller and accountant, and an attorney 
representing United in the Georgia litigation with AWECO.”78  A portion 
of the testimony focused on the fairness of the agreement between United 
and AWECO.79 United provided its reasoning for accepting $5.3 million 
on its claim of $27 million, stating that United had been able to recoup 
enough of its losses to reduce the claim; they wished to avoid the delay, 
risk, and expense involved in more litigation; and United wanted to settle 
so it could count the proceeds in its 1981 taxable year.80 
Further testimony showed the benefits to AWECO stemming from 
the settlement agreement.81  Moreover, a rather large amount of testimony 
also concerned AWECO’s interest in a non-operational oil refinery located 
in Lake Charles, Louisiana.82  While previous managers of the refinery had 
been unable to operate it for a profit, AWECO’s president declared that it 
would function under its control.83  He also said that the refinery formed 
the basis for a successful reorganization plan, and a court-appointed 
examiner testified as to the liquidation value, estimating it at $13 million 
without the knowledge of any prior liens.84  Counting the refinery, the 
examiner estimated that the proposed settlement would leave $30 million 
in the estate, while his testimony on specific assets listed properties that 
totaled only $17.5 million in value (including the refinery).85 
                                                                                                                         
 76 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 296. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. (concerning the benefits conferred to AWECO stemming from the settlement 
agreement, the court noted: “The AWECO attorney involved in the Georgia litigation 
stated that terminating the litigation would save an estimated $200,000 – 250,000 in legal 
expenses of trying the suit; the two previous litigation had cost AWECO over $700,000. 
He also testified as to the weakness of AWECO’s primary defense to the suit. AWECO’s 
comptroller declared that the settlement would generate a loss for the company that would 
carry back to offset $2-2.5 million of tax liability.”). 
 82 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 296. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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At the end of the hearing, the court declared it would approve the 
settlement and the next day it issued a written order, saying the settlement 
was “fair and equitable” and “in the best interest of the Debtor, its estate, 
and its creditors.”86  The bankruptcy court allowed a payment of $1 million 
to United after ten days and ordered that the completion of the settlement 
occur within one month.87  The IRS and Department of Energy sought a 
rehearing, which was granted and contained contrary testimony from 
AWECO’s president stating that the company had no intention to operate 
the refinery and wanted to sell it.88  The government moved for a 
continuance to develop evidence concerning the value of the refinery, but 
the court denied the motion.89  The court was only willing to allow a 
government request to submit an appraisal of the facility if United would 
extend its time limit on confirmation of the settlement, but because counsel 
for United noted the stay would jeopardize the deal, the court denied the 
stay.90 
The IRS and Department of Energy then appealed to the district 
court, arguing the settlement’s fairness to other creditors, rather than the 
fairness between AWECO and United.91  The district court rejected the 
arguments and upheld the lower court’s decision by relying on the fact that 
the bankruptcy court had taken testimony on the settlement’s fairness to 
creditors and that the bankruptcy judge had extensive knowledge of the 
case due to months of presiding over the reorganization proceedings.92  
The district judge concluded that, because it was shown through testimony 
that a settlement with United would give AWECO its only chance at 
reorganization, the settlement benefitted all creditors.93  The government 
then brought the appeal to the Fifth Circuit claiming that the bankruptcy 
court abused its discretion in approving the settlement without sufficient 
information and that fairness and equity fell victim to an apparent need for 
speed in approving the agreement.94 
In sum, the key issue in AWECO was whether the “holder of an 
outstanding senior claim can validly object to a proposed settlement with 
a junior claimant on the basis that the settlement would keep the senior 
claimant from being paid in full.”95  The court reasoned that, “[a]s soon as 
                                                                                                                         
 86 Id. at 297. 
 87 Id. 
 88 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 297. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 297. 
 95 Id. at 298. 
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the debtor files a petition for relief, [the] fair and equitable settlement of 
creditors’ claims becomes a goal of the proceedings.”96  The court deemed 
the settlement in question to fail the fair and equitable standard because it 
put the junior creditor’s interest before the senior creditor’s interest.97  The 
court noted that when courts approve settlements that deviate from the fair 
and equitable standard, the approving court abuses its discretion.98 
Ultimately, the court stated that, “[e]quitable considerations should 
be preeminent in the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”99  The decision 
in AWECO stands for the notion that as soon as the debtor files a petition 
for relief, fair and equitable settlements of the creditors’ claims become 
the goal of the proceedings.100  Unlike the Jevic decision discussed further 
infra, the AWECO Court concluded that the absolute priority rule is a firm 
pillar of priority, even in the settlement context.101  The Third Circuit 
disagreed with the decision of AWECO and sought to bring leniency to the 
application of priority rules in the settlement context of a Chapter 11 case, 
much to the dismay of unpaid senior creditors.102 
C. The Third Circuit’s View: Deviation from the Absolute Priority Rule 
In 2015, the Third Circuit decided a case filed in Delaware 
concerning a corporation operating in New Jersey entitled Official Comm. 
of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic).103  The 
case featured a class of objecting creditors that were skipped over in favor 
of more junior creditors in a Chapter 11 proceeding, after a “structured 
dismissal” was approved as conditioned by a settlement agreement.104  The 
Third Circuit held that in rare cases a structured dismissal may be 
approved even if it contains a deviation from the Bankruptcy Code’s 
absolute priority rule.105  The court reasoned that the settlement remained 
the “least bad” option and thus deviation from the priority scheme norm 
was permissible.106 While overruled, in order to glean a better 
understanding of the unpaid creditors’ claim and the subsequent Supreme 
                                                                                                                         
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See id. 
 99 Id.; see Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966); see also Demet v. 
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 100 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298. 
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 102 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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Court decision discussed more thoroughly infra,107 a full discussion of In 
re Jevic is necessary. 
Jevic Transportation, Inc. (“Jevic”) was a trucking company with its 
headquarters located in New Jersey.108  In 2006, after a steep decline in 
Jevic’s business, a subsidiary of the private equity firm Sun Capital 
Partners (“Sun”) obtained Jevic in a leveraged buyout made possible by 
various lenders led by CIT Group (“CIT”).109  The buyout included an $85 
million revolving credit facility by CIT to Jevic, which Jevic could use as 
long as it held at least $5 million in assets and collateral.110  Unfortunately 
for Jevic, “[t]he company continued to struggle in the two years that 
followed, however, and had to reach a forbearance agreement with CIT—
which included a $2 million guarantee by Sun—to prevent CIT from 
foreclosing on the assets securing the loans.”111  By May of 2008, Jevic’s 
board of directors authorized a bankruptcy filing due to the company’s 
stagnant performance and the expiration of the forbearance agreement on 
the horizon.112 
On May 19, 2008, Jevic ceased substantially all of its operations, and 
its employees received notice of their imminent terminations.113  “The next 
day, Jevic filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.”114  At the point of filing 
the Chapter 11 petition, Jevic owed approximately: “$53 million to its 
first-priority senior secured creditors (CIT and Sun) and over $20 million 
to its tax and general unsecured creditors.”115  An Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors (“Committee”) was assigned to represent Jevic’s 
unsecured creditors by June of 2008.116 
Most notably for the purposes of the following Supreme Court 
decision: some of the terminated truck drivers (“Drivers”) of Jevic filed a 
class action against Jevic and Sun claiming various federal and state 
abuses of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Acts 
(WARN);117 “under which Jevic was required to provide sixty days written 
notice to its employees before laying them off.”118  While the Drivers filed 
their WARN claim, “the Committee brought a fraudulent conveyance 
                                                                                                                         
 107 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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action against CIT and Sun on the estate’s behalf, alleging that Sun, with 
CIT’s assistance, ‘acquired Jevic with virtually none of its own money 
based on baseless projections of almost immediate growth and increasing 
profitability.’”119  The Committee asserted that Jevic’s bankruptcy had 
escalated because of the poorly advised leverage buyout and by adding 
debts it could not service.120  The Committee described Jevic’s demise as: 
“the foreseeable end of a reckless course of action in which Sun and CIT 
bore no risk but all other constituents did.”121 
The bankruptcy court granted in part and denied in part CIT’s motion 
to dismiss the case almost three years after the Committee filed its 
fraudulent conveyance action against CIT and Sun.122  The court held that 
the fraudulent transfer123 and preferential transfer124 claims by the 
Committee were adequate.125  The court noted the great possibility for 
abuse in leveraged buyouts and determined that the Committee had 
adequately alleged that: “CIT had played a critical role in facilitating a 
series of transactions that recklessly reduced Jevic’s equity, increased its 
debt, and shifted the risk of loss to its other creditors.”126  Alternatively, 
due to the Committee’s vague and sparse allegations for (1) fraudulent 
transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 544; (2) equitable subordination of CIT’s 
claims against the estate; and (3) aiding and abetting Jevic’s officers and 
directors in breaching their fiduciary duties, the Court dismissed all three 
state law claims without prejudice.127 
In March 2012, representatives from the Committee, CIT, Sun, the 
Drivers, and what remained of Jevic, came together to discuss a settlement 
of the Committee’s fraudulent conveyance action.128  At the time of the 
settlement negotiation, Jevic’s only remaining assets were the action 
against CIT and Sun and $1.7 million in cash (which was subject to Sun’s 
lien).129  In order to repay the lender group led by CIT, all of Jevic’s 
tangible assets had been liquidated.130  When the dust settled, the 
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Committee, Jevic, CIT, and Sun constructed a settlement agreement that 
contained four major provisions, i.e.:131 
(1) The parties would exchange releases for their claims against 
each other and the fraudulent conveyance action would be 
dismissed with prejudice.132 
(2) CIT would pay $2 million into an account earmarked to pay 
Jevic’s and the Committee’s legal fees and other administrative 
costs.133 
(3) Sun would assign its lien on Jevic’s remaining $1.7 million to 
a trust, which would pay tax and administrative creditors first and 
then the general unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis.134 
(4) Jevic’s Chapter 11 case would be dismissed.135 
Thus, the settlement was comprised of a structured dismissal, i.e.: “a 
disposition that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached 
instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante.”136 
The major issue of the settlement agreement was that it left out the 
Drivers, completely disregarding their uncontested WARN Act claim 
against Jevic.137  The Drivers estimated their claim to have been valued at 
$12.4 million, “of which $8.3 million was a priority wage claim[.]”138  
While it may be true that Jevic was able to quickly structure a settlement 
with one fell swoop of the pen, ultimately the settlement skipped an entire 
class of creditors, i.e., the Drivers.139  Jevic’s assets were distributed to all 
other creditors but the Drivers.140 
The Third Circuit ultimately upheld this structured dismissal.141  The 
structured dismissal essentially picked whom Jevic was going to pay back 
in order for their case to be dismissed with prejudice, while the Drivers’ 
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priority claim became an afterthought.142  The Third Circuit noted that 
settlements are favored in bankruptcy (as in other areas of law) and 
reasoned that it makes sense that courts would have more flexibility in 
evaluating settlements than in confirming plans, given the “dynamic status 
of some pre-plan bankruptcy settlements.”143  Although the Third Circuit 
took this approach, it cautioned that compliance with the Bankruptcy 
Code’s priority scheme would usually dictate whether a settlement 
satisfies the fair and equitable standard.144  The court noted that settlement 
agreements that skip a dissenting class of creditors in distributing the 
estate’s assets raise concerns regarding potential collusion.145 
The Third Circuit concluded that the Bankruptcy Court had a 
sufficient reason to approve the settlement and structured dismissal of 
Jevic’s bankruptcy case, as it was the “least bad alternative.”146  The court 
reasoned that, “there was no prospect of a plan being confirmed” and 
conversion to Chapter 7147 would have simply resulted in all of the estate 
assets going to the secured creditors.148  The court noted that it was 
regrettable that the Drivers were left out of the settlement; and that there 
was no support in the record for the proposition that a viable alternative 
existed that would have better served the estate and the creditors as a 
whole.149  The court recognized that the bankruptcy court, “in Solomonic 
fashion, reluctantly approved the only course that resulted in some 
payment to creditors other than CIT and Sun.”150 
D. Third Circuit Overruled: The Supreme Court Decision of Jevic 
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States 
addressed the Drivers’ unpaid priority claim in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding 
                                                                                                                         
 142 See id. 
 143 Id. (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium 
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Corp. (Jevic).151  The main question presented to the Supreme Court was 
whether a bankruptcy court could approve a structured dismissal that 
deviated from priority rules, to which the Court responded with a simple 
“no.”152 The Court held that, when creditors object in a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding, a structured dismissal attached to a final 
distribution must follow priority.153  This decision ultimately overruled the 
Third Circuit decision of In re Jevic,154 discussed supra.155 
Elaborating on its decision, the Court opined that the Bankruptcy 
Code’s priority scheme constituted the basic foundation of bankruptcy 
law.156  Observing the importance of priority, the Court reasoned that 
Congress would not be silent if they intended a departure from the rules.157  
Instead, the Court noted that if Congress intended to make structured 
dismissals a backdoor means to violate priority in final distributions, 
Congress would have expressly indicated that intent in the Bankruptcy 
Code.158  The Court explained that neither the words “structured” nor 
“conditions,” nor any other language relating to distributions of estate 
value as part of a dismissal were present in any relevant part of the Code.159 
Most notably for the purposes of this Comment, the Court noted that 
the Third Circuit relied upon Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors (Iridium),160 but distinguished the holding from that 
case because Iridium did not address a structured dismissal.161  Rather, 
Iridium concerned “an interim distribution of settlement proceeds to fund 
a litigation trust that would press claims on the estate’s behalf.”162  The 
Court opined that Iridium did not state that the Bankruptcy Code 
authorized deviations from priority while there were objecting parties 
                                                                                                                         
 151 See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 978 (2017). 
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within the context of a dismissal, which would be a final distribution.163  
The Court ultimately held that the structured dismissal at issue was a final 
distribution of estate value where priority must be followed.164  
Alternatively, the Court mentioned, in dicta, that the Bankruptcy Code 
usually contains justifications for interim distributions that deviate from 
priority.165 
The Court contrasted the Second Circuit case of Iridium, which 
concerned an interim distribution that violated priority, with the Third 
Circuit case of In re Jevic, which concerned a structured dismissal that 
violated priority but attached to a final disposition.166  The Court noted that 
the structured dismissal found in In re Jevic had a resemblance to the 
transactions lower courts generally refused to allow for purposes that they 
“circumvent the Code’s procedural safeguards.”167  Moreover, the Court 
stated that the “rare case” limitation of In re Jevic would not save the Third 
Circuit’s decision.168  The “rare case” exception, the Court reasoned, 
would cause potentially serious consequences of uncertainty and departure 
from protections Congress has granted.169 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Supreme Court Leaves Door Open: Future Priority-Deviations 
in Interim Settlements 
Chapter 11 parties and courts around the country may have difficulty 
discerning the Jevic decision.170  While instruments such as structured 
dismissals will be barred from priority-deviation if they are of a final 
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dispositional nature, an interim distribution of assets can deviate from 
priority rules.171  The Jevic Court failed to clarify when a distribution of 
assets is considered interim.172  Due to this uncertainty, it is foreseeable 
that parties in search of options to avoid the absolute priority rule will 
choose the settlement context to do so, mainly due to the Supreme Court’s 
express approval of Iridium, where a priority-deviating interim-settlement 
was approved.  Therefore, even though there may be other interim routes 
available, the settlement context can soon become the avenue of choice for 
Chapter 11 parties seeking priority-deviation. 
In 2007, the Second Circuit decided Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. 
of Unsecured Creditors (Iridium).173  The Second Circuit ultimately found 
that the absolute priority rule “is not necessarily implicated” when a 
settlement is presented for court approval apart from a reorganization 
plan.174  The court reviewed the argument from the AWECO Court, which 
suggested that the absolute priority rule ought to apply in pre-plan 
settlements, but disagreed and, stated that the Fifth Circuit “employ[ed] 
too rigid a test.”175  As mentioned above, the Supreme Court specifically 
distinguished the case of Iridium as a permissible violation of priority due 
to its interim nature.176 
The Second Circuit noted that, “whether a particular settlement’s 
distribution scheme complies with the Code’s priority scheme must be the 
most important factor for the bankruptcy court to consider when 
determining whether a settlement is ‘fair and equitable’ . . . .”177  While 
this is true, the court noted that a noncompliant settlement could be 
approved when the remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of approving 
the settlement.178  Specifically, when there are other factors that, viewed 
in the aggregate, compose a much more daunting challenge to fairness and 
equity, the absolute priority rule may be disregarded.179  The Second 
Circuit posited that there are circumstances that are better served by 
deviating from the rigidness of the absolute priority rule.180 
On April 25, 2017, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern Division, decided the case of In 
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re Fryar (Fryar).181  Fryar was the first bankruptcy case to interpret the 
Supreme Court decision of Jevic.  In Fryar, the debtor filed, inter alia, a 
motion for settlement.182  The settlement agreement sought to repay 
Pinnacle Bank, who had a lien on the debtor’s property in the form of a 
mortgage.183  Three unsecured creditors objected to the settlement 
agreement between the debtor and Pinnacle, claiming that Pinnacle was 
being preferred and “the priorities set for distribution under the bankruptcy 
code [were] being ordered to Pinnacle’s benefit.”184  Thus, the three 
unsecured creditors argued the settlement was not fair and equitable.185 
The court in Fryer analyzed the settlement under the guidance of the 
Supreme Court decision of Jevic.186  First, the court noted that the 
settlement did not in fact follow ordinary priority rules.187  Next, in light 
of Jevic, the court noted that the settlement might be upheld if all the 
creditors consented, but this was not the case.188  Instead, in following the 
Supreme Court’s dicta, the court stated that the next step must be to 
determine whether there were any significant Code-related justifications 
for the deviation at hand.189  The court found that the debtor had failed to 
prove that the priority-deviation by virtue of the settlement agreement with 
Pinnacle would promote a Code-related objective.190  Ultimately, the court 
held that: due to “the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Jevic, parties who 
seek approval of settlements that provide for a distribution in a manner 
contrary to the Code’s priority scheme should be prepared to prove that 
the settlement . . . is justified because it serves a significant Code-related 
objective.”191 
The cases of Iridium and Fryar are examples of the potential interim 
distributions of assets that violate priority through the medium of 
settlement agreements. Even though the court in Fryar invalidated the 
settlement agreement at issue for lack of Code-related justifications as per 
the dicta in Jevic,192 the case itself shows that the settlement context could 
see an increase in selection for future Chapter 11 proceedings as a means 
of priority-deviation.  While there are new safeguards in place to prevent 
                                                                                                                         
 181 In re Fryar, 1:16-bk-13559-SDR, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1123 (E.D. Tenn. April 25, 
2017). 
 182 See id. at *1. 
 183 See id. at *2. 
 184 Id. 
 185 See id. 
 186 See id. at *12. 
 187 Fryar, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1123, at *13. 
 188 Id. at *14. 
 189 See id. 
 190 See id. at *15. 
 191 Id. at *16. 
 192 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
2017] The Not-So-Settled Absolute Priority Rule 311 
deviation,193 the Supreme Court decision of Jevic still leaves open the door 
for priority-deviations.  As subsequent sections of this Comment suggest, 
a post hoc justification for priority-deviation does not preserve justice in 
bankruptcy law and should not be the standard going forward.194 
B. The Dangers of Priority-Deviation 
The entire process of Chapter 11 bankruptcy without priority creates 
an escape hatch for more junior creditors to satisfy their claims, while 
senior claimants are left holding the bag.  At this point the question must 
be proposed: what is the advantage of being a senior creditor if your 
priority position can be lawfully usurped before the case is resolved?  
Fairness and equity cannot be found in situations like Iridium, and other 
similar cases involving priority deviations through interim means.195  The 
fact that courts have only looked to the substance of the settlement 
between the debtor and a particular creditor to determine the fairness of 
the overall proceeds “contravenes a basic notion of fairness.”196  A plan 
that deviates from the absolute priority rule sets a lawless stage of take-
what-you-can-get mentality that destroys the bedrock principles of priority 
that bankruptcy law is founded upon. 
Through the means of an interim settlement, a debtor can be wholly 
depleted of assets before a senior creditor has a chance to be paid back 
while the settlement is upheld as fair.197  Without the rigid adherence to 
the absolute priority rule, assets may be freely taken in all directions at any 
time leading up to a plan being confirmed and create an abundance of 
dissatisfied creditors, e.g., the Drivers in the overruled Third Circuit 
decision of In re Jevic.198  Although the Supreme Court remedied the 
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Drivers’ issue, the Supreme Court still left open the door for future 
deviations of priority, which can leave future Chapter 11 parties empty-
handed in a similar fashion to the Drivers.199  This is a slippery slope that 
can undermine the entire construct and goals of bankruptcy law.  Without 
the rule’s protections, a reorganization plan may leave more senior 
creditors out of the equation entirely. 
Furthermore, it is possible that any reason can be reason enough for 
parties to seek deviation from priority rules.  For example, in the Third 
Circuit case of In re Jevic, Sun was unwilling to pay the Drivers as long 
as their WARN Act lawsuit continued due to their interest in the 
litigation.200  The Third Circuit noted that Sun, “did not want to fund 
litigation against itself.”201  Yet, the structured dismissal was still 
approved.202  The case of In re Jevic, while overruled, is still an example 
of how reasons such as conflicts of interest can lead to deviation from the 
absolute priority rule, thus leaving senior creditors unpaid.203  Conflicts of 
interest can still be reason enough to deviate from priority, and in light of 
the recent decision of the Supreme Court, interim distributions are an 
avenue for deviation to continue. 
It is foreseeable that future Chapter 11 settlement negotiations will, 
inter alia, involve parties who have direct interests against each other.  
With a relaxed interpretation of the absolute priority rule, interested parties 
will continue to be able to pick and choose when and how they will get 
paid back through interim settlements.  Applying the absolute priority rule 
at all stages of Chapter 11 proceedings would hedge that process before 
litigation ensued.  If it is not in the priority order, then there should be no 
possibility for unjust distribution of assets, regardless of the interests of 
certain creditors.  Moreover, applying a strict priority rule could 
potentially benefit debtors, as a rigid application of the absolute priority 
rule would create a less muddied scheme in which there is a concrete order 
for paying back creditors.  There would be less confusion and less 
animosity between “who” gets “what” priority. 
Arguably most important, due to a relaxed priority scheme under the 
guise of absolute priority in Chapter 11 proceedings, it is possible that 
creditors will expressly contract out of Chapter 11 with debtors for fear of 
not being paid back. The mere possibility that a creditor who obtains a 
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senior claim to the debtor’s assets can be overtaken by a junior creditor 
through an interim settlement agreement that complies with any Code 
related justification could cause creditors to shy away from Chapter 11 
altogether.  In order to be better protected, a perturbed creditor cognizant 
of the parameters of the lenient priority rule might attempt to preclude the 
debtor from choosing Chapter 11 as a reorganizational tool by express 
language in a loan agreement.  Thus, a relaxed rule of priority in Chapter 
11 can lead to a decrease in Chapter 11 filings entirely.  Why would courts 
be willing to risk so much? 
C. Counter-Analysis 
Before the Supreme Court decision of Jevic, adhering to the absolute 
priority rule in Chapter 11 was far from the norm.  A modified and more 
lenient standard had taken center stage in lieu of the more rigid rule. The 
results were detrimental to priority creditors.204  So what seems to be the 
reason for the prior deviations?  First, deviation from the absolute priority 
rule, especially in settlements, tends to hasten the process.  With a strict 
following of the rule, valuation fights over the debtor’s assets become 
inevitable.205  When parties come to a settlement agreement, courts seldom 
wish to intervene and further complicate the process.  Courts encourage 
settlement in every facet of the law and bankruptcy is no different.206  To 
hasten the progression of settlements in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, as seen in 
the Second207 and Third208 Circuit decisions, the debtor is allowed some 
leeway in distributing its assets and courts will only intervene if there are 
not “specific and credible grounds to justify the deviation.”209 
An argument against the efficiency of these rulings and the 
avoidance of valuation fights is: if parties are already aware of the 
implications of a strict interpretation of the absolute priority rule at all 
stages of Chapter 11, then the parties will understand what they are going 
up against ab initio and plan accordingly.  Giving the parties more 
information at the onset of the litigation will create more informed parties 
when settlement negotiations ultimately arise, which would therefore 
decrease the valuation fights at the backend of the settlement and facilitate 
                                                                                                                         
 204 See id. at 177. 
 205 Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 581, 593 (2016) (“In particular, senior classes were unable to consent to deviations 
from the rule, so valuation fights were required in every case.”). 
 206 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184 (citing Will v. Northwestern Univ. 
(In re Nutraquest), 434 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 207 Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating 
LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 208 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 209 Id. at 184 (citing In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 466). 
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efficiency altogether.  A rigid application could cut down negotiation time 
because parties to a Chapter 11 case will know where the law stands and 
can plan around it.  The process would be fair to the senior creditors who 
expected their priority position to be respected.  There would be 
uniformity and reliability in the terms “fair” and “equitable” that could 
give Chapter 11 filings a better appeal to creditors who are dealing in this 
arena. 
Another argument for lenient priority rules stems from the actions 
that lead up to the settlement itself, i.e., the debtor’s assets often shift and 
reorganize before a plan becomes confirmed.  The absolute priority rule is 
only implicated at the plan confirmation stage.210  Therefore, by the time 
the absolute priority rule is implicated, the debtor’s assets might have 
already gone through several substantial deviations from the rule.211  Even 
the Supreme Court has acquiesced to pre-plan deviations of priority.212  In 
essence, the absolute priority rule can be seen as “rigor for rigor’s sake,”213 
an almost useless barrier towards the end of the case because it is not often 
followed leading up to the plan confirmation stage to begin with. 
Since priority-deviation is lawful leading up to plan confirmation,214 
the absolute priority rule can, in essence, seem to be an odd creature of 
rigidity that lacks practicality.  The prophylactic purpose of the absolute 
priority rule can be entirely frustrated through any instrument, as long as 
deviation does not occur during the final disposition of a case.  But, if 
priority becomes truly absolute throughout the entire bankruptcy 
proceeding leading up to plan confirmation, then the rule will not be a 
useless barrier at the end of a Chapter 11 case.  Parties would be barred 
from priority-deviation at all stages of a Chapter 11 case, not just at the 
plan confirmation phase.  Therefore, strict adherence to the absolute 
priority rule at all stages of Chapter 11 bankruptcy would ultimately 
absolve the argument that the rule is rigor for rigor’s sake, and instead 
would become rigor for justice’s sake. 
                                                                                                                         
 210 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 211 See Lubben, supra note 205, at 598 (“The debtor-firm’s assets at the end-point of 
the case are subject to the [absolute priority] rule, but those assets might have been 
significantly reshaped before that point.”). 
 212 See generally Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017) (noting that 
pre-plan distributions of assets that deviate from priority are usually justified). 
 213 See Lubben, supra note 205, at 602 (“Strict application at confirmation seems little 
more than rigor for rigor’s sake, at a point when the barn door has been open for too long.”). 
 214 See id. at 601 (citing Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 258, 308 (2012)) (“More generally, as noted earlier, the application of strict absolute 
priority rule at the point of plan confirmation seems somewhat odd given the well-known 
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confirmation.”). 
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Consequently, even though rigid adherence to the absolute priority 
rule through all stages of a Chapter 11 proceeding may, inter alia, add an 
element of sharpened due diligence at the onset of the case, it is the best 
way to ensure just outcomes for creditors. There will be less power in the 
hands of the courts to determine when the rule will actually apply, i.e., 
determining the line between interim and final distributions of assets.  It is 
inherently unjust and unfair to usurp a senior creditor’s priority by striking 
a deal with a junior creditor at any given stage of a bankruptcy proceeding.  
It leaves the door open for depletion of the debtor’s assets without a proper 
chance for the senior creditor to exact its claims in a timely fashion. Junior 
creditors would benefit at the detriment of senior creditors, and as such, 
those proceedings are not fair and equitable per se. 
D. The Fifth Circuit Standard Should Apply 
The Fifth Circuit’s fair and equitable standard215 should be applied 
to all aspects of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, thereby hedging the 
potential increase of priority-deviating settlements and precluding any 
other interim mechanism that seeks deviation.  The Fifth Circuit noted that, 
“[a]s soon as a debtor filed a petition for relief, fair and equitable 
settlement of creditors’ claims becomes a goal of the proceedings.”216  This 
goal does not just suddenly surface during the approval process of 
compromise.217  Without the absolute priority rule before plan 
confirmation, bankruptcy courts would be able to “favor junior classes of 
creditors so long as the approval of the settlement came before the plan.”218  
A lack of priority at any stage of a bankruptcy case is at odds with 
principles of fairness.219 
By applying the Fifth Circuit’s standard of the terms fair and 
equitable to all facets of a Chapter 11 proceeding, the line drawn by the 
Supreme Court would vanish.220  There would not only be a rigid 
                                                                                                                         
 215 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting SEC v. 
American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 611 (1965)) (“The words ‘fair and equitable’ 
are terms of art – they mean that ‘senior interests are entitled to full priority over junior 
ones.’”). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
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 219 See id. (“Regardless of when the compromise is approved, looking only to the 
fairness of the settlement as between the debtor and the settling claimant contravenes a 
basic notion of fairness.”). 
 220 The line drawn by the Supreme Court refers to the Court’s approval of priority-
deviation in interim asset distributions as opposed to disapproval of instruments in Chapter 
11 bankruptcy that are attached to a final disposition, e.g., structured dismissals. Hence, 
following priority at all stages of a Chapter 11 case would absolve that line and the 
ambiguity attached to it. 
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adherence to the priority rules at the final resolution of a case but during 
all interim stages as well.  All facets of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding should be exact and create a reliable precedent for future 
creditors to interpret.  A lenient approach to the absolute priority rule in 
recent case law is diluting the priority scheme of Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in its entirety.221  The interest of creditors is not considered when more 
junior interest usurps a senior creditor through interim instruments such as 
settlement agreements. 
There is a difference between the inherent moral notions of what 
constitutes fair and equitable and the “fair and equitable” standard in 
bankruptcy law.  The “fair and equitable” standard does not apply to 
interim settlements in Chapter 11, but fairness and equity are to be 
considered in every aspect of law.  In AWECO, the court rightfully served 
fairness and equity for the senior claimant.  The court noted that, even 
though the junior creditor reached a “fair and equitable” settlement in 
terms of bankruptcy law,222 it was inherently unfair because it would have 
skipped over the more senior creditor.223  In order to be truly fair and 
equitable, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning must be the standard at all stages 
of Chapter 11 proceedings going forward. 
The Fifth Circuit argued that if the “fair and equitable” standard had 
no application before the plan confirmation, then bankruptcy courts would 
have the discretion to favor junior creditor interests so long as the approval 
of the settlement came before the plan.224  That would be neither fair nor 
equitable to the skipped senior creditor.  The words “equity” and 
“fairness” are not just terms of art in bankruptcy—they are catch phrases 
of bankruptcy law in general.225  Allowing bankruptcy courts the power to 
uphold interim distributions of assets that deviate from priority is 
inapposite with the goals of bankruptcy law. 
The most effective way to change the trends in this area of 
bankruptcy law is to amend the statutory language of the Code to apply 
the absolute priority rule into all areas of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, instead 
of just confirmed plans of reorganization.  Alternatively, a Supreme Court 
ruling that commands adherence to the absolute priority rule in all aspects 
of a Chapter 11 proceeding would also suffice.  If parties wish to waive 
                                                                                                                         
 221 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
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their procedural protections then by all means they should be able to do 
so, but when a reorganization plan surfaces—the more senior creditors 
need to have a reliable pillar of stability at the forefront. That pillar was—
and still needs to be—the absolute priority rule. 
Amending the statutory construction of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) to encompass the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning would truly 
create fair and equitable results.  Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides that a bankruptcy court may not override explicit mandates of 
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.226  Further, the Supreme Court 
noted that a bankruptcy court may not infringe upon specific statutory 
requirements.227  Therefore, an amended Code equipped with the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning—that the absolute priority rule must apply at all stages 
of a bankruptcy—would truly insulate the rule from deviation through 
express statutory language and added support from the Supreme Court. 
Bankruptcy courts should not be able to approve interim distributions 
of assets that deviate from priority, regardless of any justifications.  In 
approving settlements, a court must act “for the benefit of all creditors,”228 
not to facilitate quicker negotiations to the detriment of senior creditors 
who do not object in time.229  In an analogous situation to AWECO, the 
Supreme Court in Protective Committee v. Anderson,230 noted its 
sympathy for the desire of a court to terminate drawn-out bankruptcy 
proceedings.231  Nonetheless, the Court noted, “[t]he need for expedition 
is not a justification for abandoning proper standards.”232  Ultimately, 
upholding proper standards is what gives the law its power. 
If there are justified situations where creditors must be paid back 
outside of priority, e.g., the Code-related justifications the Supreme Court 
noted in Jevic, then those justifications should be given express priority in 
the Code.  This way, those Code-related justifications will remain an 
option due to the Code’s express accounting of those justifications in 
priority rules.  The Code itself would allocate a guaranteed priority 
position for those justifiable circumstances.  Therefore, the rule will still 
retain its true absolute form and account for circumstances where creditors 
are better served with quicker access to assets. 
                                                                                                                         
 226 11 U.S.C.S. § 105(a) (1979). 
 227 Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014). 
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Ultimately, having a strict interpretation of the absolute priority rule 
will act as a firm backbone to settlement conversations and thus facilitate 
a process more apt to fairness from the onset of any possible litigation. 
Applying the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the absolute priority rule will 
ultimately change the structure of negotiations. If the parties agree to 
waive the rule, then that is their decision—but going into a Chapter 11 
case without the assurances of a rigid absolute priority rule leaves the more 
senior creditors in a vulnerable position.  A well-settled law encompassing 
absolute priority will finally put to rest the injustice of usurped creditors 
and the ambiguity of when the rule is to be applied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A creditor expects to count on a priority system in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy the way the human body depends on the spine for support.  
Priority ought to be the backbone for all settlement negotiations in Chapter 
11 bankruptcy, not just during final dispositions of the case. There must 
be a reliable system that does not reward a junior creditor with the priority 
right of a senior creditor simply due to time constraints,233 which was noted 
in the Fifth Circuit’s decision of In re AWECO, Inc. as a major reason the 
bankruptcy court upheld the initial settlement agreement.234  A strict 
enforcement of the absolute priority rule at all stages of a bankruptcy case 
will put parties on notice at the forefront of litigation.  Due to the upfront 
knowledge of how priority will be respected, parties will be able to bargain 
with more efficiency and certainty. 
Admittedly, it is a worthy goal for debtors to make a deal that benefits 
them at an opportune time,235 but consider the consequences when a 
creditor—who not only expects, but deserves to be in that priority 
position—is overtaken by a more junior creditor and left with nothing.  
Unreliability of this sort in Chapter 11 proceedings could ultimately deter 
Chapter 11 filings through express language in loan agreements between 
creditors and debtors.  Potential creditors may be less likely to lend to a 
debtor knowing priority is not guaranteed, despite efforts to obtain 
                                                                                                                         
 233 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298 (“Time pressure apparently influenced the 
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priority.  Bankruptcy proceedings should not be risking so much in order 
to encourage the mere possibility of swift settlements.236 
Furthermore, deviation from the rule up until plan confirmation 
undermines the major equitable principles of bankruptcy law.  Whereas 
some settlements that deviate from the absolute priority rule can be fair 
and equitable as a term of art in bankruptcy law,237 when senior creditors 
are skipped over in favor of more junior creditors, the settlement becomes 
inherently unjust238 and should not be approved.  Any scenario where 
junior claimants supersede senior creditors creates an unjust environment.  
Priority-deviation may be a positive outcome for some parties in their 
individual settlements, but siphoning assets is a zero-sum game.  Junior 
interests will continue to benefit from the non-application of the absolute 
priority rule at the expense of senior creditors.239  A rule that masquerades 
itself as absolute, when it in fact and practice has become lenient, only 
undermines the basic priority constructs of bankruptcy law. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a relaxed interpretation of the absolute 
priority rule in the settlement context creates a more succinct outcome 
blatantly ignores the possibility of efficiency through rigid application of 
the rule.240  The shift to rigidity in Chapter 11 priority will lead to more 
informed parties and will lead to efficient negotiations.  The parties to a 
Chapter 11 case will be more informed because the absolute priority rule 
will follow its explicit meaning, and not what a court interprets it to be.  A 
rigid application of the absolute priority rule will foster a process that leads 
to less confusion about what the law means from the onset of litigation and 
will provide a firm foundation for settlement negotiations.  A longer 
process may possibly result,241 but that is a small price to pay for 
dissolving the ambiguity that has recently been enveloping Chapter 11. 
A strict adherence to the absolute priority rule at all stages of a 
Chapter 11 case will allow parties to consider the pros and cons of 
litigation and use that information as a bargaining tool.  Applying the Fifth 
Circuit’s strict interpretation of the absolute priority rule will prevent the 
use of interim mechanisms as an escape hatch for deviation.  Any 
justifiable scenario for priority-deviation should be given express priority 
in the Bankruptcy Code.  Used properly, the absolute priority rule is a 
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device that can lessen the amount of future contested plans and facilitate 
quicker and more efficient negotiations; which is the precise reasoning 
many courts employ today for deviating from the absolute priority rule in 
the first place.242  Ensuring that parties are aware of rigid application of 
the absolute priority rule at the onset of a Chapter 11 proceeding will 
ultimately lead to truly fair and equitable results for creditors and debtors 
alike. 
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